On January 19, 2021, the US State Department announced the imposition of sanctions on Russia-based entity KVT-RUS and Russian-flagged vessel FORTUNA pursuant to Section 232 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), for “knowingly selling, leasing, or providing to the Russian Federation goods, services, technology, information, or support for the construction of Russian
On July 16, 2020, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) issued two new Ukraine-/Russia-related general licenses: General License 15I, Authorizing Certain Activities Involving GAZ Group, which replaces General License 15H; and General License 13O, Authorizing Certain Transactions Necessary to Divest or Transfer Debt, Equity, or Other Holdings in GAZ Group, which replaces General License 13N. OFAC also updated nine related FAQs – 570, 571, 586, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, and 625 – on July 22.
Most notably, General License 15I expands the scope of the pre-existing authorization (covering only maintenance, wind-down and a very limited set of additional activities involving GAZ Group) to include new activities relating to the manufacture and sale of vehicles and related products. Although many activities were able to continue under the prior GAZ Group general licenses (due to the expansive definition of “maintenance” in FAQ 625), this appears to be an important development for GAZ Group and for prospective or new business partners of GAZ Group. OFAC has not disclosed any specific developments triggering this change, such as with respect to the ownership or control of Oleg Deripaska in GAZ Group, although the new license does provide for new reporting obligations related to ownership and control of GAZ Group.
General License 15I authorizes certain activities, subject to numerous limitations stated therein, for 190 days – from July 16, 2020 through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, January 22, 2021 – which is over a month longer than any of its predecessors.
On July 15, 2020, the U.S. Department of State updated its public guidance on Section 232 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (“CAATSA”), which authorizes (but does not require) the president to impose sanctions on “a person” that “knowingly” invests in Russian energy export pipelines, or that sells Russia goods, technology or services for such pipelines where certain monetary thresholds are met.
The Department of State announced that the purpose of the updated guidance is “to expand the focus of implementation of Section 232 to address certain growing threats to U.S. national security and foreign policy interests related to Russian energy export pipelines, particularly with respect to Nord Stream 2 and the second line of TurkStream.” This is a significant change, as the prior public guidance stated “The focus of implementation of Section 232 sanctions would be on . . . [Russian] energy export pipeline projects initiated on or after August 2, 2017 . . . For the purposes of Section 232, a project is considered to have been initiated when a contract for the project is signed. Investments and loan agreements made prior to August 2, 2017 would not be subject to Section 232 sanctions.” This prior guidance had suggested that the focus of implementation of Section 232 would not be on Nord Stream 2 or Turkstream (either line), because these projects were “initiated” before August 2, 2017.
Following a joint request from several EU national competent authorities (“NCAs”), the European Commission issued an opinion on asset freeze measures imposed on non-EU entities that are controlled by designated persons targeted by EU Council Regulation No 269/2014. The Regulation concerns restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine (“the Regulation”). In its opinion, the Commission takes position on the interpretation of article 2 of the Regulation, which requires EU operators to freeze all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by persons designated in Annex I to the Regulation. EU operators are also prohibited from making funds or economic resources available, directly or indirectly, to these designated persons. The guidance provided by the Commission is of particular relevance to credit and financial institutions that may be required to comply with EU asset freeze measures.
The NCAs asked the Commission a number of questions in connection with the interpretation of paragraph 63 of the EU Best Practices Guidance, which sets out the criteria to be taken into account when assessing whether a legal person or entity is controlled by another person or entity. The EU Best Practices are non-binding recommendations which aim to promote the uniform implementation of EU sanctions.
On December 31, 2019, the US District Court for the Northern District of Texas threw out a $2 million fine issued in 2017 by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) under the Ukraine-Related Sanctions Regulations (URSR), 31 C.F.R. § 589. The much-awaited opinion held that OFAC did not provide “fair notice” that the URSR prohibited dealing in contracts signed by a sanctioned individual on behalf of a non-sanctioned company, prior to the issuance of the penalty.
In reaching its decision, the Court concluded that the language of the URSR did not “’fairly address’ whether a US entity receives a service from [a Specially Designated National (SDN)] when that SDN performs a service enabling the US person to contract with a non-blocked entity.” Moreover, public statements made by relevant US government officials in 2014—some of which could be read to conflict—did not “create ascertainable certainty” of OFAC’s intention with respect to the URSR’s application. (The Court also held that contemporaneous reports by media outlets were not probative of OFAC’s regulatory intent.)
On April 25, 2019, OFAC announced that Haverly Systems, Inc. (“Haverly”), a New Jersey software company, had agreed to pay $75,375 to settle apparent violations from 2014 related to Haverly’s collection of payments from JSC Rosneft (“Rosneft”), a Russian oil major on OFAC’s Sectoral Sanctions Identifications (“SSI”) list. The key issue was OFAC’s finding that Haverly accepted the payments from Rosneft outside of the then-applicable 90-day window and thereby dealt in the restricted “new debt” of Rosneft. This appears to be the first time OFAC has published a settlement involving violations of the SSI list Directives, and underscores the importance for companies subject to US jurisdiction of monitoring invoicing and payments with SSI list entities and their subsidiaries. Non-US companies may also face “secondary sanctions” risk under Section 228 of CAATSA, on which we have previously advised, for certain types of transactions with SSI list designees. See also our previous advisory on OFAC’s SSI list sanctions, along with our previous discussion of the CAATSA-mandated changes to those sanctions.
Pursuant to Directive 2 under Executive Order 13662 and § 589.201 of OFAC’s Ukraine-Related Sanctions Regulations, US persons are prohibited from transacting or otherwise dealing in “new debt” of longer than certain stated maturity periods of SSI list designees or any entities of which they own 50% or more. At the time of this apparent violation, the relevant maturity period was 90 days. “Debt” is defined broadly to include any “extensions of credit.” OFAC has stated in FAQ guidance that open payment terms, such as the time permitted to pay commercial invoices, also fall within the scope of “new debt.”…
Continue Reading New Jersey Software Company Settles with OFAC for Accepting Late Payments from Rosneft
On February 13, 2019, the State Department provided a summary of Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s recent phone call with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, which stated that “Secretary Pompeo reiterated the US determination to hold Russia accountable for its use of a chemical weapon in Salisbury, UK through sanctions as required by the CBW Act.” The sanctions Secretary Pompeo referenced are the second round of sanctions slated to be imposed on Russia under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act) for that country’s use of a nerve agent against a former Russian spy and his daughter in the United Kingdom. The decision to impose the second round of CBW Act sanctions was announced in November of last year, but there has largely been radio silence from the administration over the past few months with respect to a timetable for imposition or the type of sanctions to be imposed. While the summary of Secretary Pompeo’s call did not provide any additional detail on those questions, it is notable as it indicates that despite the months of delay the administration is still expressing an intent to move ahead with the sanctions.…
Continue Reading Secretary Pompeo: More Russia Sanctions Are Coming … Sometime
On September 20, 2018, the State Department announced sanctions on China’s Equipment Development Department (EDD) (formerly known as the General Armaments Department (GAD)) and its director, Li Shangfu, for engaging in significant transactions with Russia’s Rosoboronexport for the delivery to China of Su-35 combat aircraft in 2017 and equipment for S-400 surface-to-air missile systems in 2018. The EDD is part of the Chinese State Council’s Central Military Commission and plays a key role in the Chinese government’s international military cooperation efforts.
This marks the first time the US government has imposed sanctions under Section 231 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). It is also the most significant sanctions action taken by the US government to date under the CAATSA Russia sanctions authorities. Notably, the Trump Administration chose the most severe measure available under the “menu” of sanctions available under Section 231 of CAATSA – the addition of the targeted persons to the Specially Designated Nationals (“SDN”) list – along with some other restrictions. …
Continue Reading Trump Administration Sanctions Key Chinese Military Entity under Russia Authorities
On August 8, 2018, the US State Department announced that it would be imposing new sanctions on Russia pursuant to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act). The new sanctions are in response to a determination by the US government that the Russian government was behind the recent use of a nerve agent in the United Kingdom against two UK citizens. The CBW Act requires the imposition of sanctions following a determination by the President (delegated to the Secretary of State) of the use of chemical or biological weapons in violation of international law or in lethal form against one’s own nationals. Sanctions under the CBW Act, which are expected to take effect on August 22nd, include the termination of foreign assistance, suspension of sales of defense articles or services, denial of credit or other financial assistance by the US government, and a prohibition of exports of national security-sensitive goods and technology. In a background briefing the State Department announced that it is making “a number of carve-outs” to these sanctions to allow the continuation of certain foreign assistance; exports for space flight activities, safety of commercial passenger aviation, and “purely commercial end users for civilian end uses”; and perhaps other activities. A Federal Register notice that is to be published by the State Department on August 22 should explain the sanctions and carve-outs in more detail. According to the State Department, this is the third occasion on which sanctions have been imposed under the CBW Act. Sanctions under the Act were imposed against Syria in 2013 and against North Korea earlier this year.…
Continue Reading US State Department Announces New Russia Sanctions
As the world turns… There have been several key developments recently in the Russia sanctions context:
- Issuance of General License 15. This general license, issued May 22, authorizes maintenance and winding down of pre-April 6 business with GAZ Group and its subsidiaries through October 23. The authorization is similar in scope to General License 14, issued on April 23 with respect to Rusal.
- Issuance of General License 13B. This general license, issued May 31, added EN+ Group PLC to the list of companies (previously consisting of GAZ Group and Rusal) for which divestment of holdings is permitted, and extended the deadline for divestment from June 6 to August 5. The general license also permits divestment of holdings in the subsidiaries of the covered companies under certain circumstances.
- Issuance of General License 16. This general license, issued just yesterday, authorizes certain activities to maintain or wind down pre-April 6 business with EN+ Group PLC, EuroSibEnergo, and their subsidiaries through October 23.
- Lapse of General License 12C. This general license previously had authorized certain activities to maintain or wind down pre-April 6 business with several Russian companies (see the list below). That authorization lapsed yesterday, meaning that business with the companies covered by the general license no longer is permitted.
- President Putin signs Russian “counter-sanctions” into law. Yesterday, President Putin signed into law a bill that gives him the power to sever relations with “unfriendly” countries and prohibit trade with such countries. Notably, the bill as initially proposed would have banned a range of US goods and services, including certain US food, alcohol, medicine, and consulting services, but it was watered down significantly before reaching the president’s desk. Consideration of a related bill, which would criminalize compliance with US sanctions on Russian soil, has been postponed for the time being.
So where do things stand? Here’s a short summary:…
Continue Reading Russia Sanctions: General Licenses, Deadlines, Russian Counter-Measures– What’s the Latest?