On May 19, 2023, in conjunction with the G7, Australia, and other international partners, the US government announced a range of new export controls and sanctions and added 71 entities to the Entity list, primarily for supporting Russia’s military and defense sectors.  The new export controls – and new sanctions, which are the subject of a separate blog post – reflect the continued efforts of the US (in coordination with international allies) to target those attempting to circumvent or evade sanctions or export controls against Russia and Belarus.  The new measures are intended to further undermine the Russian and Belarusian industrial bases and counteract their ability to continue to support the war in Ukraine and to further limit Russia’s energy revenue and future extractive capabilities.  

Also on May 19, 2023, the Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) and the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) issued a Joint Supplemental Alert entitled “FinCEN and the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security Urge Continued Vigilance for Potential Russian Export Control Evasion Attempts” (the “Supplemental Alert”), which is intended to assist financial institutions in the risk-based screening of export-related financial transactions in order to determine whether customers and transactions may be connected to export controls evasion.

Continue Reading BIS Expands Export Controls on Russia and Belarus and Issues New Joint Alert with FinCEN

On April 18, 2023, Matthew Axelrod, Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement at the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), issued a memorandum outlining two important changes to BIS’s settlement guidelines when significant potential violations of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) are identified. Specifically, BIS announced that (1) the deliberate non-disclosure of a significant potential violation will now be treated as an aggravating factor in civil enforcement cases, and (2) whistleblowing of significant potential violations by another party that ultimately results in a BIS enforcement action will be considered a mitigating factor in any future enforcement action involving the whistleblower, even for unrelated conduct. The policy changes are intended to incentivize the submission of disclosures to BIS when industry or academia uncovers significant EAR violations (i.e., those reflecting possible national security harm, as opposed to minor, technical violations).

BIS’s new policy of treating non-disclosure of significant potential violations of the EAR as an aggravating factor marks a potential sea change in the voluntary self-disclosure (VSD) risk calculus for exporters and reexporters. By reorienting the purpose of the VSD to serve as both carrot and stick, BIS has now interjected more complexity into the voluntary disclosure decision making process. Companies that may have been inclined, previously, to remediate significant potential violations but not disclose may now face a more difficult choice. While it may take years for the civil penalty data to demonstrate the concrete costs of non-disclosure of significant potential violations of the EAR, consideration of that factor is likely to weigh heavily in any future BIS VSD decisions.

Continue Reading A Carrot and a Stick: BIS Clarifies Policy on Self-Disclosures and Whistleblowing

On February 24, 2023, the US government announced a range of new export controls, sanctions, and tariffs to coincide with the first anniversary of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine. These actions by the US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), the US Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the US Department of State, and the White House reflect the continued efforts of the US – in coordination with its allies – to impose costs on Russia for the war.

Each successive round of US export controls and sanctions presents new compliance challenges, against the backdrop of heightened enforcement risk resulting from aggressive, well-coordinated US government actions. US and non-US entities and individuals who engage in transactions related to Russia or Belarus should pay close attention to this complex and evolving regulatory framework. Additionally, entities and individuals exporting to Iran should take note of the expanded scope of the US Export Administration Regulations (EAR) under a new Iran Foreign Direct Product (FDP) Rule.

Continue Reading US Imposes Additional Export Controls, Sanctions, and Tariffs targeting Russia, Belarus, and Iran On First Anniversary of Russia’s War Against Ukraine

On February 16, 2023, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Commerce Department announced the creation of the Disruptive Technology Strike Force with a mission to prevent nation-state “adversaries” from acquiring “disruptive” technologies.  The strike force will be co-led by Assistant Attorney General Matthew Olsen of the DOJ’s National Security Division (NSD) and Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement at the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Matthew Axelrod, and will bring together the DOJ’s NSD, BIS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Homeland Security Investigations, and 14 US Attorneys’ Offices in 12 metropolitan regions. 

The strike force’s mandate, and remarks by Deputy Attorney General Lisa Monaco announcing the new initiative, illustrate the US government’s continuing focus on protecting sensitive data and “disruptive” technologies, as well as the regulatory and enforcement tools that the US government has used and will continue to use to prevent the acquisition, use, and “abuse” of “disruptive” technologies by autocratic governments to commit human rights abuses and seek strategic advantage vis-à-vis the United States.

Continue Reading Justice and Commerce Departments Announce Creation of Disruptive Technology Strike Force

Further to our post about General License (GL) No. 23, on February 21, 2023, the US Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), issued Guidance on Authorized Transactions Related to Earthquake Relief Efforts in Syria (the Guidance).  Although it does not appear that OFAC has published the Guidance as part of formal Frequently Asked Questions, affected US persons and non-US persons who are relying on GL 23 should review the Guidance, which provides additional OFAC interpretations about the scope of GL 23 until it is scheduled to expire on August 8, 2023.  More specifically, the Guidance covers topics such as:

(1) donating money and raising funds for earthquake relief efforts in Syria;

(2) sending money to the people of Syria;

(3) sending any goods or providing any services to Syria;

(4) processing financial transactions related to earthquake relief in Syria;

(5) earthquake relief activity or efforts involving the Government of Syria (GOS);

(6) non-governmental organizations providing aid to Syria;

(7) activity by foreign governments in Syria; and

(8) application of US secondary sanctions under the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019.

Continue Reading Additional OFAC Guidance and BIS Licensing Policy Statement on Earthquake Relief for Syria

On January 17, 2023, the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an interim final rule (the “January 17 rule”), expanding its recent China-focused export controls, related to advanced computing and semiconductors, to Macau.  These controls, initially imposed on China (including Hong Kong), were announced in an interim final rule on October 7, 2022 (the “October 7 rule”). 

Continue Reading BIS Extends Advanced Computing and Semiconductor Rules to Macau

On October 7, 2022, in a move that was hailed by senior U.S. government officials as a paradigm shift in U.S. export controls policy toward China, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued an interim final rule that amends the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) to impose new and expanded controls on advanced computing integrated circuits (ICs), computer commodities that contain such ICs, and certain semiconductor manufacturing items. Transactions for supercomputer end-uses and transactions involving certain entities on the Entity List are now subject to additional export controls, as are certain semiconductor manufacturing items and transactions for certain IC end uses. U.S. person activities as they relate to certain semiconductor activities in China are also now restricted.

Certain aspects of the rule, specified below, including the availability of license exceptions, became effective immediately on October 7, 2022. The new restrictions on U.S. person activities under § 744.6 became effective on October 12, 2022. The remainder of the provisions with a delayed effective date are specified below and will become effective on October 21, 2022. BIS is also accepting public comments on the interim final rule through December 12, 2022.

Separately, also on October 7, 2022, BIS issued a final rule, which revised the Unverified List (UVL) and clarified the activities and criteria that may lead to the addition of an entity to the Entity List. BIS stated that a sustained lack of cooperation by the host government in a country where an end-use check is to be conducted, such as China, that effectively prevents BIS from determining compliance with the EAR, will be grounds for adding an entity to the Entity List.

The U.S. policy goals behind the new rules are ambitious and seek to degrade China’s advanced computing capabilities in an unprecedented manner. As summarized recently by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan: “On export controls, we have to revisit the longstanding premise of maintaining ‘relative’ advantages over competitors in certain key technologies.  We previously maintained a ‘sliding scale’ approach that said we need to stay only a couple of generations ahead. That is not the strategic environment we are in today. Given the foundational nature of certain technologies, such as advanced logic and memory chips, we must maintain as large of a lead as possible.”

The broad implications of these new rules, along with their efficacy from a policy standpoint, may take some time to come fully in to focus. For now, it is clear that any U.S. or non-U.S. individuals or entities that play any role in the global semiconductor supply chain—whether as manufacturers, producers, consumers, or otherwise—need to carefully review the new rules to determine what is required to comply and, if necessary, seek guidance or a license from BIS.

Continue Reading BIS Issues Expansive New Rules Targeting China

In a new rule that took effect on September 15, 2022, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) expanded and clarified the scope of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) in a number of ways, some of which impose significant new compliance challenges related to Russia and Belarus.  To stay up with the latest developments, readers are encouraged to monitor and review new guidance in the form of Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) published by BIS at https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/country-guidance/russia-belarus.

Continue Reading US Implements Subtle but Significant Expansions of Export Controls on Russia, Belarus, and Other Countries

This year, we have witnessed an extraordinary set of coordinated economic sanctions and export control regulatory actions against Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. In contrast to the fast and furious pace of regulatory action, enforcement actions did not keep pace.

This year’s enforcement actions by the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) are notable for their jurisdictional reach and expansion of liability theories that aren’t necessarily supported by the plain language of their regulatory authority. The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry & Security (BIS) enforcement actions have targeted the aerospace industry, especially in relation to Russia and Belarus. The Department of Justice (DOJ) expended much of its resources on seizing and forfeiting assets linked to Russian oligarchs, galvanizing its multilateral networks.

Interestingly, OFAC continued to target the Iranian petroleum and petrochemical sector despite news reports of intensive negotiations to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Below we discuss some representative enforcement actions to date.

Continue Reading What to Expect Next? US Economic Sanctions and Export Controls Enforcement Actions Thus Far in 2022

On June 28, 2022, the Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) and the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued a Joint Alert entitled “FinCEN and the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security Urge Increased Vigilance for Potential Russian and Belarusian Export Control Evasion Attempts” (“Joint Alert”).  The Joint Alert marks the first time FinCEN and BIS have collaborated on an alert of this nature and has important implications for both financial institutions and exporters/international trade parties.

Continue Reading New Joint Alert Puts Export Compliance Focus on Financial Institutions