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Peter Jeydel's practice focuses on US export controls and economic sanctions, including the Commerce Department’s Export Administration Regulations (EAR), the State Department’s International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), and sanctions regulations administered by the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and the State Department. His practice spans all aspects of these regimes, including counseling, compliance, transactional advice, licensing and opinions, disclosures, and enforcement actions. He has also represented companies and individuals seeking de-listing from OFAC’s sanctions list. In addition, Pete has assisted clients in anti-corruption matters, including under the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), and has experience handling reviews and investigations by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).

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On September 24, 2021, the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued General License 14 (GL-14) and General License 15 (GL-15), authorizing certain types of humanitarian transactions involving Afghanistan that could relate to the Taliban or the Haqqani Network that would otherwise be prohibited by the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (GTSR), the Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations (FTOSR), or Executive Order (EO) 13224.

Both the Taliban and the Haqqani Network are designated by OFAC as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) pursuant to EO 13224. The Haqqani Network is also designated by the US Department of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.  Furthermore, several of the individual members of the Taliban and the Haqqani Network are designated by OFAC as SDGTs.

These groups have recently taken control of, and appointed officials (including at least one individual designated as an SDGT) to administer, the Government of Afghanistan and its associated agencies and organizations.  As a result, there are concerns that interactions with the Government of Afghanistan could be prohibited to the extent they involve a person subject to US sanctions or expose parties to broader risks under US counter-terrorism financing laws.


Continue Reading OFAC’s New Afghanistan-Related Humanitarian Licenses: Opportunities and Challenges

On August 20, 2021, the Biden administration issued a new Executive Order (“EO”) entitled “Blocking Property with Respect to Certain Russian Energy Export Pipelines.”  At the same time, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) added five entities and 13 vessels to the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (“SDN List”) under the new EO.

These developments – the latest in a series of US actions related to the Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream pipelines – suggest that the United States is attempting to strike a balance between formally opposing the Nord Stream 2 project and cooperating with major allies who favor the pipeline’s completion, such as Germany.  Importantly, the sanctions under the new EO are not as incrementally significant as they may seem: of the 18 new SDNs, all but four (two entities and two vessels) were already subject to sanctions under the Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act of 2019 as amended (“PEESA”), which were imposed in May 2021 and were virtually identical to the new sanctions.  Rather than reflecting a more aggressive US stance in opposition to Nord Stream 2, the new EO appears to be driven primarily by legal technicalities including a limitation on the sanctions that could be imposed under PEESA.


Continue Reading A Pipeline Runs Through It: US Government Strikes Delicate Balance on Nord Stream 2 with New Executive Order, Four Sanctions Designations

On June 24, 2021, US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) issued a Withhold Release Order (WRO) pursuant to 19 USC 1307 against Xinjiang, China-based Hoshine Silicon Industry Co. Ltd. and its subsidiaries (Hoshine). The WRO instructs CPB personnel to detain shipments of silica-based products produced by Hoshine and its subsidiaries, including “materials and goods (such as polysilicon) derived from or produced using those silica-based products.”

On the same day, the US Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added Hoshine Silicon Industry (Shanshan) Co., Ltd  and four other Xinjiang-based companies to the Entity List based on allegations of their participation “in the practice of, accepting, or utilizing forced labor” in their production processes.

On June 23, 2021, the Department of Labor (DOL) published a Federal Register notice updating its List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor  (TVPRA List) to include polysilicon from China.

Meanwhile, the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) advanced a bill that, if passed, would impose additional restrictions on the importation of goods from China’s Xinjiang Province.


Continue Reading Biden Administration Targets Xinjiang-based Solar Companies over Labor Allegations

China’s Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (the “Law”), which was enacted and became effective on June 10, 2021, authorizes the Chinese government to develop an “anti-sanctions list” and to impose countermeasures on listed persons involved in “discriminatory restrictive measures.”  It also creates a private right of action for Chinese citizens and organizations to sue in a Chinese

On April 19, 2021, OFAC effectively reactivated longstanding sanctions against nine Belarussian companies and their subsidiaries, revoking a general license that had authorized transactions involving those entities since 2015.  These sanctions may impact a significant number of Belarussian companies, as several of the listed entities are large conglomerates.

US sanctions on Belarus were first imposed in 2006 under Executive Order 13405, with similar EU sanctions beginning in 2004, in response to concerns about the electoral process and human rights abuses in Belarus.  However, in 2015, OFAC had issued a general license broadly authorizing transactions with these nine companies and their subsidiaries, but without actually lifting the underlying sanctions.  This limited and conditional sanctions relief in 2015 was part of a coordinated US/EU policy brought about by an improved political and human rights climate in Belarus at the time.  Until now, this general license had regularly been extended since it was first issued in 2015 (as we previously discussed, along with a more detailed history of this sanctions program).


Continue Reading OFAC Reactivates Sanctions against Belarussian Companies and Provides 45-day Wind Down Period

On April 15, 2021, the White House and the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) announced a package of economic sanctions targeting Russia, including expansive new legal authorities that would allow for the imposition of additional future sanctions on Russia in the technology sector and on Russian government bodies.  OFAC has also issued expanded restrictions on participation in the primary market for Russian sovereign debt, and lending to the Russian government, by US financial institutions.  In addition, OFAC blocked nearly 40 additional individuals and entities for “attempt[ing] to influence the 2020 [US] presidential election” and engaging in certain activities in Crimea.  At the same time, the US Department of State announced the expulsion of 10 Russian diplomats.

The centerpiece of the package is Executive Order (“E.O.”) 14024, which, according to an OFAC press release, “elevates the [US] government’s capacity to deploy strategic and economically impactful sanctions to deter and respond to Russia’s destabilizing behavior.”  As the first significant Russia sanctions action by the Biden Administration, E.O. 14024 appears to have been intended to send a strong signal to Russia, but without taking action at this stage that would be highly or disproportionately economically damaging.  In taking this approach, it appears that the Administration has left open the possibility of an improvement in relations with Russia.  Indeed, these sanctions were preceded by President Biden’s April 13th proposal of a possible summit with President Putin to “discuss the full range of issues facing the United States and Russia.”


Continue Reading New Russia Sanctions Focused on the Technology Sector and Sovereign Debt Markets

On March 8, 2021, the US Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) published amendments to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) imposing new export control restrictions on Myanmar (Burma) and adding four entities to the Entity List, in response to a military coup in early February 2021.

The BIS announcements follow the imposition of sanctions on 12 individuals and three entities by the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), pursuant to Executive Order 14041 of February 10, 2021.

In addition to designating major military-linked commercial entities to the Entity List, the new EAR amendments make Myanmar ineligible for certain license exceptions and add Myanmar to the list of countries subject to BIS’s military end use / military end user rule (the MEU Rule)—alongside China, Russia, and Venezuela.

For background on the US government’s previous Myanmar-related measures in response to the recent coup, including Executive Order (EO) 14014, see our blog post of February 12, 2021, “Biden Administration Announces Sanctions and Export Controls in Response to Myanmar Coup.”


Continue Reading Commerce Department Issues Significant New Export Controls in Response to Myanmar Coup

On January 19, 2021, the Department of Commerce published an Interim Final Rule (the “Rule”) setting out a more detailed regulatory structure to implement Executive Order 13873, which authorizes Commerce to prohibit or otherwise regulate transactions involving information and communications technology or services (“ICTS”) with a nexus to “foreign adversaries” that pose an “undue or unacceptable risk” to US national security.  See also our post on the predecessor proposed rule.  The stated purpose of the Rule, which bears some resemblance to (though differs in many ways from) the foreign investment review and mitigation process administered by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (“CFIUS”), is to protect US national security through a focus on the ICTS supply chain.

The Rule identifies for the first time the following as covered “foreign adversaries”:

  1. China (including Hong Kong)
  2. Russia
  3. Cuba
  4. Iran
  5. North Korea
  6. “Venezuelan politician Nicolás Maduro (Maduro Regime)


Continue Reading Insights on the Information and Communications Technology and Services (“ICTS”) Rule

On February 11, 2021, the White House issued an Executive Order (EO) authorizing sanctions in response to the February 1, 2021, military coup in Myanmar (Burma). The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) named ten individuals and three entities as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) pursuant to the EO. At the same time, the US Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced new restrictions on certain exports to Myanmar of items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).

This is the first new sanctions program adopted under the Biden administration, less than one month after the inauguration. Prior US sanctions and export controls targeting Myanmar were terminated in October 2016. Since then, the United States continued to maintain targeted sanctions against certain individuals and entities under other sanctions programs, including a number of SDNs named under the Global Magnitsky Sanctions program.


Continue Reading Biden Administration Announces Sanctions and Export Controls in Response to Myanmar Coup

Peter Jeydel and Brian Egan from Steptoe’s Economic Sanctions group published an article in the American Society of International Law’s “ASIL Insights” on the recent decisions by two US District Courts to bar the U.S. government temporarily from restricting transactions with Chinese mobile app TikTok under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). As they