On April 15, 2021, the White House and the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) announced a package of economic sanctions targeting Russia, including expansive new legal authorities that would allow for the imposition of additional future sanctions on Russia in the technology sector and on Russian government bodies.  OFAC has also issued expanded restrictions on participation in the primary market for Russian sovereign debt, and lending to the Russian government, by US financial institutions.  In addition, OFAC blocked nearly 40 additional individuals and entities for “attempt[ing] to influence the 2020 [US] presidential election” and engaging in certain activities in Crimea.  At the same time, the US Department of State announced the expulsion of 10 Russian diplomats.

The centerpiece of the package is Executive Order (“E.O.”) 14024, which, according to an OFAC press release, “elevates the [US] government’s capacity to deploy strategic and economically impactful sanctions to deter and respond to Russia’s destabilizing behavior.”  As the first significant Russia sanctions action by the Biden Administration, E.O. 14024 appears to have been intended to send a strong signal to Russia, but without taking action at this stage that would be highly or disproportionately economically damaging.  In taking this approach, it appears that the Administration has left open the possibility of an improvement in relations with Russia.  Indeed, these sanctions were preceded by President Biden’s April 13th proposal of a possible summit with President Putin to “discuss the full range of issues facing the United States and Russia.”Continue Reading New Russia Sanctions Focused on the Technology Sector and Sovereign Debt Markets

On March 2, 2021, the US Departments of Treasury, State, and Commerce announced the coordinated imposition of sanctions and other restrictive measures on Russia and Russian officials and entities for the “poisoning and subsequent imprisonment of Russian opposition figure Aleksey Navalny.” The Department of the Treasury added seven Russian officials and entities to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (the SDN List) pursuant to Executive Order (EO) 13661 and EO 13382, thereby blocking their property or interests in property that come within the possession of US persons or the jurisdiction of the United States. US persons are now prohibited from engaging in transactions with these SDNs. The State Department designated seven entities under its own authority, including four that were already on the SDN List. Treasury further expanded the sanctions applied to Russia in 2018 after the poisoning of Sergei Skripal in the UK, and named six entities as operating for the Russian defense sector, triggering sanctions. The Commerce Department announced the addition of fourteen entities to the Entity List, which triggers a licensing requirement for exports, re-exports, and in-country transfers to those entities of all items subject to the US Export Administration Regulations (EAR).
Continue Reading US Applies Wide Range of Sanctions to Russian Officials and Entities

On February 11, 2021, the White House issued an Executive Order (EO) authorizing sanctions in response to the February 1, 2021, military coup in Myanmar (Burma). The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) named ten individuals and three entities as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) pursuant to the EO. At the same time, the US Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced new restrictions on certain exports to Myanmar of items subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR).

This is the first new sanctions program adopted under the Biden administration, less than one month after the inauguration. Prior US sanctions and export controls targeting Myanmar were terminated in October 2016. Since then, the United States continued to maintain targeted sanctions against certain individuals and entities under other sanctions programs, including a number of SDNs named under the Global Magnitsky Sanctions program.Continue Reading Biden Administration Announces Sanctions and Export Controls in Response to Myanmar Coup

In a Federal Register notice dated February 5, 2021, the US Department of State provided notice that the Secretary of State has determined that six individuals sanctioned by the US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) on January 15, 2021 fulfilled the criteria for being designated as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs) under Section 4(a)(iii) of Executive Order (EO) 13936, which authorizes the Treasury and State Departments to impose blocking sanctions in relation to certain events in Hong Kong.

The State Department issued similar notifications on January 22, 2021 (here and here) with respect to a total of 18 individuals designated as SDNs under EO 13936 on December 7 and November 9, 2020. No such determination appears in the Federal Register for 11 individuals designated under EO 13936 on August 7, 2020.

The Secretary of State’s recently issued determinations do not alter OFAC’s SDN designations, which took effect on January 15, 2021, December 7, 2020, and November 9, 2020, respectively, nor has the State Department added the individuals to its report under Section 5(a) of the Hong Kong Autonomy Act.Continue Reading US State Department Issues Notices on Prior Hong Kong Sanctions Designations

On January 19, 2021, President Trump issued Executive Order (EO) 13984, “Taking Additional Steps To Address the National Emergency With Respect to Significant Malicious Cyber-Enabled Activities” (86 Fed. Reg. 6,837 (Jan. 25, 2021)), taking further action under the national emergency declared by President Obama in Executive Order 13694 of April 1, 2015.  EO 13984 directs the US Department of Commerce (Commerce) to: (1) promulgate know-your-customer (KYC)-type identification and recordkeeping obligations on US “Infrastructure as a Service” (IaaS) providers engaging in foreign transactions, and (2) consult with other US government agencies to impose “special measures,” i.e., restrictions, on foreign jurisdictions and persons, i.e., actors, determined to be using US IaaS to engage in significant malicious cyber activities.

The EO describes IaaS as “products to provide persons the ability to run software and store data on servers offered for rent or lease without responsibility for the maintenance and operating costs of those servers,” and includes a lengthy definition of different types of IaaS products that are covered by the EO. Although some reports have focused on the impact that EO 13984 may have on cloud service providers, the EO’s broad definition for IaaS could sweep in other information technology service providers operating in the US.

The EO is not effective immediately, and may not go into effect for several months or longer.  The EO directs Commerce “to propose for notice and comment” regulations within 180 days implementing the KYC and “special measures” directives described above.  In addition, EO 13984 was issued by President Trump at the very end of his administration, and it is possible that the Biden Administration will delay implementation for a longer period of time as it reviews the legal and policy implications of the EO.Continue Reading US Infrastructure as a Service Providers (IaaS) – New Know-Your-Customer Requirements?

On January 19, 2021, the US State Department announced the imposition of sanctions on Russia-based entity KVT-RUS and Russian-flagged vessel FORTUNA pursuant to Section 232 of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), for “knowingly selling, leasing, or providing to the Russian Federation goods, services, technology, information, or support for the construction of Russian

On January 1, 2021, the U.S. Senate passed – over President Trump’s veto – the National Defense Authorization Act, or NDAA, for Fiscal Year 2021 (H.R. 6395), a massive annual Department of Defense spending bill, which this year includes a section expanding sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream pipeline projects.  The Senate action follows House passage of the bill over the President’s veto on December 28, 2020.

Section 1242 of the 2021 NDAA broadens the scope of the sanctions provisions contained in the 2020 NDAA in the following principal ways:

  • For Nord Stream 2 only, it targets foreign persons that provide “services for the testing, inspection, or certification necessary or essential for the completion or operation of the … pipeline[.]”
  • For both Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream, it –
    • expands the scope of sanctionable activities in support of pipe-laying for these projects to include activities that “facilitate pipe-laying, including site preparation, trenching, surveying, placing rocks, backfilling, stringing, bending, welding, coating, and lowering of pipe[;]”
    • includes, in addition to selling, leasing or providing the covered pipe-laying vessels, “facilitat[ing]” that activity (even if not involving “deceptive or structured transactions,” language that had been included in the 2020 NDAA); and
    • clarifies that the scope of sanctionable activity includes providing underwriting services for covered vessels or insurance or reinsurance necessary or essential for the completion of the project; and providing services or facilities for technology upgrades or installation of welding equipment for, or retrofitting or tethering of, covered vessels that are necessary or essential for the completion of the project.

Continue Reading U.S. Tightens Sanctions on Nord Stream 2, TurkStream Pipeline Projects

On November 30, 2020, the US Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) announced the addition of Chinese company CEIEC to its list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN List), pursuant to Executive Order 13692, for “its role in undermining democracy in Venezuela.”  OFAC also issued General License 38 authorizing certain wind-down activities with CEIEC, as well as an FAQ regarding the designation and general license.

According to Treasury, CEIEC, also known as China National Electronic Import-Export Company, has over 200 offices and subsidiaries worldwide.  CEIEC explains on its website, https://www.ceiec.com/About, that it is a “close partner of many foreign government[s], military and security department[s], to help them fulfill their mission of securing citizen’s confidence to health, safety, economic growth and public governance.”

In the press release announcing CEIEC’s addition to the SDN List, Treasury explained that the designation is due to the company’s involvement in “actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions” in Venezuela.  For example, Treasury stated that CEIEC provided “software, training, and technical expertise to Venezuela[n] government entities, which was then used against the people of Venezuela.”Continue Reading OFAC Adds Chinese Tech Company CEIEC to SDN List, Issues General License 38 Authorizing Wind-Down Activities

On November 17, 2020, OFAC issued Venezuela General License 8G, “Authorizing Transactions Involving Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PdVSA) Necessary for the Limited Maintenance of Essential Operations in Venezuela or the Wind Down of Operations in Venezuela for Certain Entities.”  General License 8G extends the pre-existing authorization for US persons to engage in certain transactions and activities involving the Venezuelan state-owned oil company PdVSA through 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time, June 3, 2021, for Chevron, Halliburton, Schlumberger, Baker Hughes, and Weatherford International.  These are some of the most significant petroleum companies with US connections operating in Venezuela.  Aside from extending the expiration date – which had been December 1, 2020 – General License 8G is substantively the same as general License 8F, which it replaces.

Specifically, General License 8G authorizes US persons to engage in transactions and activities “ordinarily incident and necessary to the limited maintenance of essential operations, contracts, or other agreements” for the above-mentioned companies and their subsidiaries that –

  1. are for safety or the preservation of assets in Venezuela;
  2. involve PdVSA or any entity in which PdVSA owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest; and
  3. were in effect prior to July 26, 2019.

Continue Reading OFAC Issues Updated General License 8G Extending Authorization of Transactions with PdVSA for Five Petroleum Companies

On July 16, 2020, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) issued two new Ukraine-/Russia-related general licenses:  General License 15I, Authorizing Certain Activities Involving GAZ Group, which replaces General License 15H; and General License 13O, Authorizing Certain Transactions Necessary to Divest or Transfer Debt, Equity, or Other Holdings in GAZ Group, which replaces General License 13N.  OFAC also updated nine related FAQs – 570, 571, 586, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, and 625 – on July 22.

Most notably, General License 15I expands the scope of the pre-existing authorization (covering only maintenance, wind-down and a very limited set of additional activities involving GAZ Group) to include new activities relating to the manufacture and sale of vehicles and related products.  Although many activities were able to continue under the prior GAZ Group general licenses (due to the expansive definition of “maintenance” in FAQ 625), this appears to be an important development for GAZ Group and for prospective or new business partners of GAZ Group.  OFAC has not disclosed any specific developments triggering this change, such as with respect to the ownership or control of Oleg Deripaska in GAZ Group, although the new license does provide for new reporting obligations related to ownership and control of GAZ Group.

General License 15I authorizes certain activities, subject to numerous limitations stated therein, for 190 days – from July 16, 2020 through 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time, January 22, 2021 – which is over a month longer than any of its predecessors.Continue Reading OFAC Authorizes Additional Activities Involving GAZ Group